























A capstone project submitted to John Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for the 















2020 Salvador Ortega 














Russia is one of the largest producers of energy in the world, especially when it comes to the 
production of natural gas. Because of its close proximity to Europe, it has always been a reliable supplier 
of natural gas and energy for European countries. That energy reliance can come at cost that can strain 
the relationship between the U.S. and countries in Europe as well as weaken institutions such as the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization.  This policy proposal looks at the issue of Russia’s energy dominance 
in Europe and puts forth an alternative source of natural gas that Europe could import from in order to 
diversify their natural gas supply and lessen their dependence on Russian exports. 
 
















Table of Contents 
 Section         Page 
I. Action Forcing Event          1 
II.  Statement of the Problem         1 
III.  History and Background          5 
IV.  Policy Proposal           13 
V.  Policy Analysis          18 
VI.  Political Analysis         27 
VII.  Recommendation          37 
 Curriculum Vitae         40 
 
 
List of Tables and Figures 
Title         Page 
Table 1: GECF Natural Gas Exports, 2017        2 
Figure 1: Who’s Dependent on Russia’s Gas? 2017       6 
Table 2: Natural Gas Import Dependency Rates of Some EU        24 
            Countries and Turkey- 2012 
Table 3: Different Export Options Cost & Revenue Comparison       25 
 
  1 
TO:  Secretary of State Mike Pompeo 
FROM:  Salvador Ortega 
DATE:   May 5, 2020 
SUBJECT: Addressing Russia’s Energy Dominance in Europe 
 
I. ACTION FORCING EVENT 
In December, 2019, the United States Congress passed the Eastern Mediterranean Security and 
Energy Partnership Act of 2019 to diversify Europe’s energy options and move away from reliance on 
Russian natural gas exports.1 This comes at a time when Russia is trying to expand its ability to export 
natural gas to Europe via pipelines such as the recently completed TurkStream pipeline.2 
 
II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Russia continues to expand its ability to export its natural gas to the European Union and NATO 
allies, further increasing these countries dependency on Russian natural gas. If Russia is allowed to 
continue to invest in creating natural gas pipelines, they can use those exports as leverage to influence 
decision making and policies in Europe and NATO that would benefit Russia, or at least not be harmful 
towards Russia, and cause friction and disunity between EU and NATO members. As can be seen by 
Table 1, Russia is already one of the world largest exporters of natural gas, exporting around 20 percent 
of total world exports, the majority of which gets exported by pipeline. 
 
                                                          
1 Prince, Todd. “Congress Passes More Legislation Aimed At Curbing Russia’s Energy Grip on Europe.” December 21, 2019. Radio 
Free Europe Radio Liberty. Available at: https://www.rferl.org/a/congress-passes-more-legislation-aimed-at-curbing-russia-s-
energy-grip-on-europe/30337217.html  
2 Tanas, Olga. “Russia Readies New Gas Link to Europe in Defiance of U.S.” January 8, 2020. Bloomberg. Available at: 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-01-08/russia-opens-natural-gas-link-to-turkey-amid-u-s-opposition 
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Table 1. GECF Natural Gas Exports, 20173 
Country Exports (bcm) % of World Exports 
Russia 230.9 20% 
Qatar 121.8 11% 
Algeria 53.0 5% 
Nigeria 27.8 2% 
Bolivia 14.9 1% 
Trinidad and Tobago 13.4 1% 
Iran 12.5 1% 
United Arab Emirates 7.7 1% 
Equatorial Guinea 4.8 <1% 
Libya 4.4 <1% 
Egypt 1.2 <1% 
Venezuela 0.0 0% 
 
 In 2017, Russia accounted for almost 40 percent of all natural gas imports into the European Union.4 
This already gives Russia leverage over the EU, and as they are able to increase their exports to Europe 
by completing pipeline projects such as NordStream2 and the TurkStream pipeline, their economic 
power and influence will grow in the region.  
Russia has already shown that it is able and willing to use its resources to meddle in the affairs 
of other countries to try and destabilize governments, institutions, and group cohesion that it perceives 
as a threat to its own interests. Further, it is willing to use its control of natural gas exports to achieve its 
objective. One of the most blatant uses of this ability by Russia in recent years was in regards to Ukraine 
and resulted in military intervention and continued occupation of parts of Ukraine by Russian military 
forces.5 In 2014, Russia cut off natural gas because Ukraine had failed to make payments on its debts to 
Gazprom, the Russian owned energy company.6 This also followed the 2014 Russian invasion of Ukraine 
                                                          
3 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF): Cartel Lite?, by Michael 
Ratner, IF10939 (2018). Available at 
https://www.crs.gov/Reports/IF10939?source=search&guid=c7f5b182ff474bf387b496ce62cb8876&index=1#_Ref520887538. 
4 “From Where Do We Import Energy and How Dependent Are We?” Shedding light on energy on the EU. Eurostat, European 
Union. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/infographs/energy/bloc-2c.html. 
5 Steven Pifer. “Five years after Crimea’s illegal annexation, the issue is no closer to resolution”. Brookings. March 18, 2019. 
Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/03/18/five-years-after-crimeas-illegal-annexation-the-
issue-is-no-closer-to-resolution/. 
6 Paul Kirby, “Russia’s gas fight with Ukraine.” BBC News, October 31, 2014. Can be accessed out. 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29521564. 
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and subsequent occupation of Crimea, showing that Russia is willing to use its gas exports as a tool to 
pursue their interests as well as military intervention along with their cyber and disinformation 
capabilities.  
Another example that illustrates Russia’s desire for energy dominance in Europe is the incident 
in Georgia in 2006 where gas pipeline explosions disrupted gas supplies in that country. Russia had been 
pressuring the pro-western government of Georgia to sell Russia its pipeline so that Russia could have 
control of the transportation of natural gas to the region and gain access to Iran.7 Even though the 
Georgia incident did not end up working in Russia’s favor due to the fact that Georgia blamed Russia for 
the explosions and Russia blamed insurgents, and Georgia ultimately did not sell the pipeline to Russia, 
the example shows that Russia places a significant amount of importance on the movement and control 
of natural gas in pursuing its interests.  
The instances with Ukraine and with Georgia help to illustrate why Russia feels a need to 
construct both the Nord Stream 2 and Turkstream pipeline. Russia wants to be able to control the flow 
of natural gas from Russia to wealthier western European countries like Germany without having to pay 
and deal with previously constructed pipelines through countries such as Ukraine. By being the largest 
provider of natural gas for a country’s needs, Russia can use that relationship to leverage influence over 
the importing country to try and sway policies that would either be favorable to Russia, or at least less 
harmful to Russia while straining and possible fracturing the relationships and cohesion between EU 
member countries an NATO allies.  
 A final problem with Russia’s pursuit of energy dominance of Europe is how Gazprom operates 
and the relationship between Gazprom and Kremlin officials. The Russian governments owns just over 
50% of Gazprom, meaning that the gas company operates more as an arm of the Russian government 
                                                          
7 Karen Smith Stegen. “Deconstructing the “energy weapon”: Russia’s threat to Europe as case study.” Jacobs University 
Bremen, Germany. Elsevier. July, 2011. 
  4 
than it does as a private energy company.8 This allows the Kremlin to use Gazprom as a tool when 
deciding how Gazprom should go about collecting debt, like the Ukraine example where Gazprom shut 
off access to natural gas, and the type of projects Gazprom gets involved in, such as the Nord Stream 2 
pipeline and Turkstream pipeline project. Gazprom also has very close ties to the Kremlin and Russian 
leadership. For example, before becoming Russia’s President in 2008, Dmitry Medvedev served as 
Chairman of the Board of Gazprom in 2000. 9 With the relationship between the government and board 
officials, Gazprom is able to operate as a state-owned energy company at times and can be a powerful 
tool for Putin and the Russian government to use against Europe and the West. If European countries 
are reliant on natural gas imports from Russia to fulfil their energy needs, it puts those countries and 










                                                          
8 Gazprom. “Shares”. Available at: https://www.gazprom.com/investors/stock/. 
9 Karen Smith Stegen. “Deconstructing the “energy weapon”: Russia’s threat to Europe as case study.” Jacobs University 
Bremen, Germany. Elsevier. July, 2011. 
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III. History and Background 
Russia has historically been, and continues to be, one of the largest natural gas producers in the 
world. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, as of 2017, Russia holds the largest 
reserves of natural gas in the world, an estimated 1,688 trillion cubic feet (Tcf). Natural gas exports 
make up around 13% of Russia’s total export revenue with around 90% of Russia’s natural gas being 
exported by pipelines to customers in Europe such as Germany, Turkey, and Italy.10 Due to natural gas 
playing such an important role in Russia’s economy, Russia has made great effort in the development 
and construction of pipelines within its borders as well as throughout Europe. When Russia was still the 
Soviet Union, many of the natural gas pipelines that were built were through former Soviet states such 
as Ukraine and Belarus. This proved to be the most direct way to export natural gas throughout its 
territory when the countries were under the control of Moscow. However, with the fall of the Soviet 
Union and the independence of many former Soviet countries, Russia needed to be able to construct 
new pipelines that would give them access to the European market in case countries such as Ukraine 
and Belarus became difficult to work with or outright refused to work with Russia.  
The Ukraine crisis of 2014 is a good example of the interests of Russia and Ukraine differing and 
Russia does not want to be in a situation where they have to give in to demands from Ukraine and 
interrupting natural gas exports to Europe. Figure 1 below illustrates just where many of the natural gas 
pipelines from Russia to Europe are.  
                                                          
10 “U.S. Energy Information Administration – EIA- Country Analysis Brief: Russia.” October 31, 2017. Accessed at: 
https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/countries_long/Russia/russia.pdf. 













As can be seen by Figure 1, many of the pipelines from Russia go through Ukraine and Belarus. Because 
of this Russia has placed an importance on constructing the Nord Stream, Nord Stream 2, and 
Turkstream pipelines so that it has more direct control over the natural gas from Russia to Europe. This 
is because they do not want to be stuck in a situation that they had previously been in with Ukraine 
where they limit the amount of natural gas they pipe through Ukraine and instead of Ukraine sending it 
through to Europe, Ukraine takes it for their needs and then blames the lack of European natural gas 
availability on Russia.12  
Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2 both have the capacity to carry 1.9 trillion cubic feet of natural 
gas per year directly from Russia to Germany, and from there Germany can choose to consume it for its 
                                                          
11 Shiryaevskaya, Anna and Khrennikova, Dina. “Why the World Worries About Russia’s Natural Gas Pipeline.” November 6, 
2019. The Washington Post. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/energy/why-the-world-worries-about-
russias-natural-gas-pipeline/2019/10/31/c3c12892-fbfb-11e9-9e02-1d45cb3dfa8f_story.html. 
12 Collins, Gabriel. Russia’s Use of the “Energy Weapon” in Europe. Houston, TX: Baker Institute for Public Policy, July 18, 2017. 
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own energy needs, or export it to other countries throughout Europe.13 Through the Nord Stream 1 
pipeline and other means, Russia already supplies Europe with a large percentage of their gas imports by 
making up 23% of UK gas imports, 25% in France, 62% in Germany, and 64% in Poland.14 The Nord 
Stream 2 pipeline is the second pipeline from Russia to Germany through the Baltic Sea. It is a 1,200-
kilometer (about 750 mile) ling pipeline and would be able to carry an additional 55 billion cubic meters 
of natural gas per year, the same amount as the Nord Stream pipeline which effectively doubles the 
amount of natural gas Russia can export through this corridor.15 The dependence of European countries 
on Russian energy and natural gas places many of the countries in situations where Russia has leverage 
over them by threatening to cut off gas exports to countries such as Germany, giving Russia an 
unnecessary amount of influence over policy outcomes.  
Even though Russia has shown and continues to show a habit of being antagonistic towards the 
West and Europe and meddling in democratic processes and policies, why then do European countries 
like Germany continue to enter into agreements with Russia to continue to use Russian natural gas as a 
means of energy consumption? The same explanation for oil can be given in the case of natural gas. 
During the oil price disputes of the 1970’s and 1980’s, Europe sought to diversify where they sourced 
their petroleum from in case issues in the middle east became volatile and they lost access or the supply 
of oil was disrupted. 16 These disruptions led to European nations going against U.S. President Ronald 
Regan and U.S. policy by agreeing buy petroleum from the Soviet Union and the construction of oil 
pipelines. European countries such as Germany and the United Kingdom approached the decisions they 
made after the oil price disputes by looking at their own energy security needs regardless of the 
potential risks that purchasing energy from the Soviet Union held. To dissuade European countries from 
                                                          
13 “U.S. Energy Information Administration – EIA- Country Analysis Brief: Russia.” October 31, 2017. Accessed at: 
https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/countries_long/Russia/russia.pdf. 
14 Collins, July 18, 2017. 
15 Nord Stream 2. Gazprom. https://www.gazprom.com/projects/nord-stream2/. 
16 Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power (New York: Free Press, 2009), 742-744. 
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purchasing energy from the Soviet Union, then President Reagan instituted policies where he banned 
the export of compressors and pumps that General Electric produced that were used in gas pipelines, 
and when contractors decided to look for non-U.S. manufactured alternatives, President Reagan 
imposed similar bans to non-U.S. manufacturers that used U.S. technology or parts in their products.17 
Even though President Reagan and the U.S. had good relationships with both the United Kingdom and 
West Germany and their leaders, both the United Kingdom and West Germany ultimately ignored the 
bans and policy decisions by President Reagan and decided to import energy from Russia because they 
viewed it as necessary for their energy security and industry needs. 
In the current case of natural gas, a similar situation is occurring in regards to the relationship 
between some European nations and Russia. This idea of diversifying energy needs and supplies is 
something that many European countries continue to address. Germany, for example, has to import 
about 90% of its total natural gas supply needs, and roughly 40% of that natural gas comes from 
Russia.18 However, even though Germany has to import most of its natural gas needs, natural gas only 
makes up about 23% of Germany’s energy needs. Germany has also been investing and transitioning to 
using renewable energy in order to make itself less reliant on fossil fuels such as oil and natural gas. In 
fact, Germany has a plan to make renewable energy to be about 60% of its final energy consumption by 
2050, and in 2014 renewable energy generated about 27% of Germany’s energy needs.19 Even though 
Germany approves of projects such as Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2, they are trying to diversify the 
types of energy they use so as to not be overly reliant on one form of energy.  
Other countries, such as France, are turning towards importing Liquified Natural Gas, LNG, as a 
way of mitigating a reliance on Russia for its natural gas needs. France imports about 25% of its natural 
                                                          
17 Marshall Goldman, Petrostate: Putin, Power, and the New Russia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 137-138. 
18 “U.S. Energy Information Administration – EIA – Independent Statistics and Analysis.” Germany – International – Analysis- 
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.php?iso=DEU. 
19 Julian Wettengel. “Germany’s Dependence on Imported Fossil Fuels.” Clean Energy Wire, August 27, 2019. 
https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/germanys-dependence-imported-fossil-fuels 
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gas from Russia, but natural gas is only about 14% of its energy needs. However, France also imports a 
lot of LNG from Algeria since it has LNG terminals, and in 2015, France imported about 210 billion cubic 
feet of LNG with over 60% of these imports being from Algeria.20 Another place to source LNG would be 
from the United States. Since 2016, the United States has begun to export LNG to countries around the 
world with total LNG exports growing by 53% in 2018 compared to 2017.21  
Although this is a good alternative to Russian natural gas, and it is in the U.S. interest to sell its 
LNG to Europe, the main issue with LNG is that it is expensive and difficult to move. There needs to be a 
LNG terminal that changes the natural gas from its gas form to a liquid, then it needs to be stored 
properly for shipment, and then the recipient needs to have the LNG terminal to turn the natural gas 
back from a liquid into its gas form for consumption. This is an expensive process and some countries, 
like Germany, do not even have LNG terminals to perform this process.22 So even if the U.S. can export 
LNG to Germany, Germany has no way to make use of it. This is one of the main reasons why Germany 
has gone against the advice of the United States Congress and different Presidential administrations, 
and why Germany is such as supporter of continuing the Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2 pipeline 
projects with Russia. Although they know the security risks, they also know that they need a certain 
amount of natural gas in order to fulfil their energy needs, and it is more cost effective and faster to 
construct pipelines to import natural gas than it is to construct LNG terminals. 
When it comes to this policy proposal, it is important to mention which countries are involved 
with which pipelines that have made the situation what it is today. In the case of the Nord Stream and 
Nord Stream 2 pipelines, the main countries involved are Germany and Russia. The pipelines serve as a 
way for Germany to get direct access to Russian natural gas from Russia, and Germany’s government 
                                                          
20 “U.S. Energy Information Administration – EIA – Independent Statistic Analysis.” France – International – Analysis – U.S. 
Energy Information Administration (EIA). https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.php?iso=FRA.  
21 “Interactive Map: U.S. Liquified Natural Gas Exports Breaking Records.” Energy.gov. U.S. Department of Energy. 
https://www.energy.gov/articles/interactive-map-us-liquefied-natural-gas-exports-breaking-records. 
22 eia.gov, Germany 
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works to actively change their domestic laws to ensure that the pipeline meet European Union 
regulations.23 Turkey is another major player in gas pipelines to Europe. As mentioned in the action 
forcing event section, Turkey and Russia have recently completed the TurkStream pipeline, and if 
expanded upon this would be another way for Russian natural gas to get to countries in Europe.  
On the other hand, Greece, Italy, and France are working to try and use the Eastern 
Mediterranean Gas Forum in order to get pipelines built that would supply natural gas to Europe from a 
source that is not Russia.24 The Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum is a recently established forum that 
comprises Egypt, Israel, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority aimed at 
coordinating regional energy policies and attempting to develop the regions gas market.25 The creation 
of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum could prove to be a viable alternative supply of natural gas for 
European countries, especially with the interest of European countries such as Italy and France in 
pursuing alternate supplies to Russia. 
 When addressing Russia’s use of natural gas as a weapon or means of influence over Europe, it 
is important to note just how close the leadership of Russia’s natural gas company, Gazprom, and Putin 
and the Kremlin are. When Russian President Vladimir Putin first came to power in 2000, he made it a 
priority of his to address the corruption and mismanagement of Gazprom by replacing its leadership 
with his own friends and allies. He replaced former Gazprom CEO Rem Vyakhirev with his friend Alexei 
Miller and had Dmitry Medvedev serve as the Chairman of the Board of Gazprom prior to Medvedev 
becoming Russia’s President in 2008.26 With the Russian government being the majority shareholder of 
Gazprom and with Putin allies being in leadership positions, this essentially gave and continues to give 
                                                          
23 Joseph Nasr. “Germany makes legal changes to ease completion of Russian gas pipeline”. Reuters. November 13, 2019. 
Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-russia-pipeline/germany-makes-legal-changes-to-ease-completion-
of-russian-gas-pipeline-idUSKBN1XN2I1. 
24 Ahmed Ismail. “France asks to join Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum”. Reuters. January 16, 2020. Available at: 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-gas/france-asks-to-join-eastern-mediterranean-gas-forum-idUSKBN1ZF1V2. 
25 Nael M. Shama. “Gas and Conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean”. Atlantic Council. February 19, 2019. Available at: 
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/gas-and-conflict-in-the-eastern-mediterranean/ 
26 Marshall Goldman, Petrostate: Putin, Power, and the New Russia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 140-142.  
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the Russian government control of one of the largest natural gas companies in the world and enables 
them to wield its power and influence as it sees fit. This becomes a major issue when other pipeline 
projects are being worked on by other countries that would go around Russian controlled pipelines 
because Putin is able to use the power of Gazprom to go to other countries and give them a better 
pipeline option or help broker a new contract that would give the country a lower rate than the global 
market rate.27 
 Currently there are several bills in the United States Congress that look to address Russia’s 
expanding influence Europe’s energy sector. One such bill is a sanctions bill that addresses the 
construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline which was introduced by United States Senators Cruz, 
Shaheen, Barrasso, and Cotton called S. 1441, the Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act of 2019.28 This 
bill would impose sanctions against persons and entities (vessels) that engaged in laying down the 
pipeline, sold, leased, or provided vessels for the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. This 
sanctions bill would not punish Germany from accepting the imported gas from a completed Nord 
Stream 2 pipeline, but would target those involved with the construction of the pipeline. It requires the 
Secretary of State to put together a list of the parties involved with the construction and, in consultation 
with the Secretary of the Treasury, submit a list of all of the entities to the appropriate congressional 
committees so that they can be reviewed and sanctioned from the U.S. financial system. Presumably, 
many of the sanctioned individuals and companies will be Russian since Russian entities were the most 
heavily involved in the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, however, according to this bill, that is 
up for the Secretary of State and Secretary of Treasury to decide.  
                                                          
27 Ibid, 145-152.  
28 Ted Cruz. “S.1441 – 116th Congress (2019-2020): Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act of 2019.” Congress.gov. 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/1441/text. 
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 Although the U.S. has made its position on the expansion of Russian natural gas capabilities in 
Europe clear, Europe continues to push forward with Russia’s natural gas pipeline projects. In the case 
of Nord Stream 2, one reason why the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline had been delayed was 
because Denmark was holding out on giving the project the green light since some of the pipeline passes 
through Danish territories. However, as of October 2019, Denmark gave Russia the go ahead on finishing 
the pipeline project as a way to snub the President of the United States since both leaders had some 
public disagreements over various issues such as the President discussing buying Greenland and later 
cancelling a trip to Denmark.29 Even with the possible threat of sanctions, Nord Stream 2 looks to be on 
its way towards completion, and with its completion Russia will be able to double to amount of natural 













                                                          
29 Morten Buttler, William Wilkes, and Anna Shiryaevskaya. “Denmark Snubs Trump With Approval of Russian Gas Pipe to 
Germany.” Bloomberg Government. BGOV, October 30, 2019. https://www.bgov.com/core/news/#!/articles/Q079BD6S974Z.  
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IV. Policy Proposal 
The policy proposal is to is to have the United States support the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum 
and work with allies and partner countries to support a natural gas pipeline from the natural gas fields 
off the coast of Israel and Egypt to Europe so that countries in Europe can have an alternate source of 
natural gas to import. This can be done by using the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum as a platform to 
gather support and cooperation among allies, and by the United States bringing in and leveraging the 
private sector to help provide assistance and guidance on the construction of a natural gas pipeline. The 
U.S. should back the recently proposed EastMed gas pipeline that Greece, Israel and Cyprus have agreed 
to pursue, as well as continue to be supportive of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum by offering 
technical expertise and security support.30  
 
a) Policy Goal 
The goal of this policy proposal is to combat Russia’s growing natural gas dominance of Europe. This 
can be done by providing Europe with an alternate source of natural gas from which to import via 
pipeline resulting in a reduction of Russian natural gas imports, thus shrinking reliance on Russian 
natural gas for Europe, and diminishing Russia’s economic growth and potential political influence over 
Europe. By having the United States engaging in and supporting natural gas pipeline in the Eastern 
Mediterranean region, Russia will be less likely to interfere and Europe will have more alternatives for 
obtaining natural gas. The success of the policy proposal would be measured by the amount of natural 
gas that a newly constructed pipeline would be able to ship to Europe and a reduction of natural gas 
exported from Russia to Europe, which in turn reduces Russian profits and economic power. Whether or 
not the United States is the one to construct the pipeline does not matter to the goal of the policy. The 
                                                          
30 Angeliki Koutantou. “Greece, Israel, Cyprus sign East Med gas pipeline deal”. Reuters. January 2, 2020. Available at: 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-greece-cyprus-israel-pipeline/greece-israel-cyprus-sign-eastmed-gas-pipeline-deal-
idUSKBN1Z10R5. 
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United States can act as an advisor and work with partners on the ground that end up constructing the 
pipeline or pipelines, such as any of the energy companies that are from countries that are a part of the 
Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum. The important goal and success of the policy is the reduction of 
Russian exports of natural gas to Europe. 
  
b) Policy Authorization 
The policy proposal uses several pieces of legislation that have been enacted into law in order to 
authorize the successful implementation of this policy. The first piece of legislation that would be used 
to authorize this proposal is the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019 
which was recently passed and became law in December, 2019 in H.R.1865, the Further Consolidated 
Appropriations Act of 2020.31 The bill authorizes the Department of State to enter into agreements in 
order to enhance the cooperation on energy issues between the United States, Israel, Greece, and 
Cyprus. It also requires that the Department of State reports on a strategy for enhancing security and 
energy cooperation with Eastern Mediterranean countries, malign Russian influence in the region, and 
violations of Cyprus’s exclusive economic zone and Greece’s airspace.32 This gives the Department of 
State the authority to discuss and enter into agreements that would accomplish the goals set out by this 
proposal, as well as require data to be collected and reports submitted on Russian activity in the region 
that could be disruptive to the construction of a natural gas pipeline. Under this authority, the 
Department of State should be able to request to join the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum as a 
permanent member. This would allow the U.S. to be at the table and be able to increase its influence 
over the decisions made by the gas forum and be a bigger part of any joint ventures the forum decides 
to undertake. 
                                                          
31 Public Law 116-94. December 20, 2019. 515-522. Available at: https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/hr1865/BILLS-
116hr1865enr.pdf 
32 Ibid. 
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The second important piece of legislation that can be used to authorize this proposal is the Better 
Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 or the BUILD Act of 2018 which became 
law on October 5, 2018 after passing H.R.302, the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018.33 This bill 
establishes the United States International Development Finance Corporation, which is to replace the 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation. The Unites States International Development Finance 
Corporation will be able to make loans or loan guarantees, be a minority investor to acquire equity or 
financial interests in entities, provide insurance or reinsurance to private sector entities and qualifying 
sovereign entities, provide technical assistance administer special projects, establish enterprise funds, 
issue obligations, and charge service fees.34 The BUILD Act allows the U.S. government to bring in the 
private sector on development and infrastructure projects so that U.S. government dollars and private 
sector dollars can be used to accomplish development goals. Through the BUILD Act, private sector 
energy and construction companies can be brought in to help advise, and if they wish, help construct a 
natural gas pipeline, such as the EastMed pipeline, or any other pipeline project to send gas from the 
Eastern Mediterranean to Europe.  
Both the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019, and the BUILD Act of 
2018 are new authorities created that have not been able to show any results from their enactment yet. 
Although the BUILD Act of 2018 established the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, it 
did not receive any appropriations until the recently passed Further Consolidated Appropriations Act of 
2020 which means it was effectively unable to operate as intended and pursue projects until it received 
its appropriations.35 Because the IDFC is new, this could be one of the first instances in which it uses its 
resources and authority to help advise and provide technical assistance to the Eastern Mediterranean 
                                                          
33 Public Law 115-254. October 5, 2018. 301-335. Available at https://www.congress.gov/115/plaws/publ254/PLAW-
115publ254.pdf 
34 Ibid 
35 Public Law 116-94. December 20, 2019. 307-308. Available at: https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/hr1865/BILLS-
116hr1865enr.pdf. 
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Gas Forum and the construction of the EastMed pipeline, even if the U.S. government or private sector 
does not actively participate in the construction of a pipeline and instead acts as an advisor. 
 
c) Policy Implementation 
This policy will be implemented by several different agencies and institutions working together in 
coordination in order to achieve the policy goals. The United States Department of State will be the 
main coordinating implementor since they have the authority and mandate to engage with foreign 
governments and entities on behalf of the U.S. government. The United States International 
Development Finance Corporation will be another main implementor working in coordination with the 
Department of State since they have the authority to leverage and finance development projects and 
will be key in bringing in private sector engagement and resources from the United States as well as in 
the Eastern Mediterranean region. The IDFC can take this opportunity to use its new resources and 
created authorities to help provide technical assistance and guidance to the EastMed pipeline project. It 
can help bring in U.S. private sector energy companies to work with and help advise the energy 
companies and governments involved in the construction of the pipeline such as Israel, Greece, and 
Cyprus.36  
The policy can be implemented by whoever the U.S. decides to appoint as their representative to 
the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum once they request to become a full member for the gas forum, 
and not just being an observer of the forum as it currently is. Additionally, the coordination could be 
aided by and overseen by the creation of a Special Envoy for the Eastern Mediterranean. The special 
envoy would work with the different agencies of the Department of State that will be interacting in the 
area, the Department of Energy, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, and private 
                                                          
36 Nikos Tsafos. “Can the East Med pipeline Work?”. CSIS. January 22, 2019. Available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/can-
east-med-pipeline-work. 
  17 
sector partners similar to the creation of other special envoy positions in the past for when the U.S. 
views a region or project as being vital for U.S. foreign policy and security goals.37 Successful 
implementation of this policy would be when members of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum 
cooperate to construct a natural gas pipeline from the Eastern Mediterranean to Europe, such as the 
EastMed pipeline or another pipeline, and it is able to be a viable alternative source of natural gas so 
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V. Policy Analysis 
The success of this policy will be seen in the successful coordination and completion of either 
the EastMed pipeline, or any subsequent pipeline constructed by the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum 
done with U.S. involvement and resulting in a decrease of natural gas imports by the European Union 
from Russia. In the beginning of 2020 the United States expressed its desire to be a permanent observer 
of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, however, the U.S. should go a step further and ask to become 
a member, like France recently has, in order to be better situated to achieve policy goals and 
objectives.38 In order to accomplish this a comparative look at the construction costs and amount of 
natural gas transported needs to be looked at between the EastMed pipeline and the Nord Stream 
pipeline.  
Comparison - Construction and Cost of Pipelines: 
When analyzing the cost and purpose of the EastMed pipeline and any subsequent natural gas 
pipelines in the Eastern Mediterranean region, it is necessary to compare the reasons and cost behind 
the pipeline to what the pipelines are competing against, since they are being offered as a viable 
alternative to Russian exports. The idea of running two natural gas pipelines parallel to each other 
comes from Russia’s Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2 pipelines from Russia to Germany. For the purpose 
of this section, the Nord Stream pipeline will be compared to the East Med pipeline, and Nord Stream 2 
can be compared to a future pipeline.  
The Nord Stream pipeline was completed in 2012, is 1,224 kilometers long and able to carry 55 
billion cubic meters of gas per year.39 The pipeline ended up costing €8.8 billion Euros, or around $9.8 
billion U.S. dollars.40 Nord Stream was financed and is owned by a combination of European and Russian 
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energy companies, however Gazprom does own 51 percent of the project, giving it a controlling interest 
and say when it comes to gas shipments and profit.41 The Nord Stream pipeline was the first of two 
pipeline projects that Russia and Germany have worked on over the past decade in order for Germany 
to have more direct access to natural gas, and was an opportunity for Russia to expand its influence and 
ability to export natural gas to Europe without having to use the existing pipeline in Ukraine. The 
completion of the pipeline allowed for a more direct transfer of natural gas from Russia to Germany and 
Central Europe and also cost Ukraine around $720 million in lost transit fees.42 Thanks in part to the 
completion the Nord Stream pipeline, Russia was able to increase the amount of natural gas that 
countries need to import from it to fulfill their needs. For example, in 2015, several years after the 
completion of Nord Stream, Russian natural gas accounted for over 40 percent of Italy’s gas 
consumption and about one third of Germany’s gas consumption.43 The Nord Stream pipeline made 
natural gas cheaper for Germany and other central European countries, however it came at the cost of 
increasing Russia’s economic and soft power in the region. 
 The EastMed pipeline is designed to supply Europe with natural gas and be a viable alternative 
for European countries to import gas from instead of from Russia. In 2010, the U.S. Geological Survey 
issued a report estimating that there were between 3.5 trillion and 6.3 trillion cubic meters of natural 
gas located in this area of the Eastern Mediterranean.44 The Proposed EastMed pipeline is a 1,300 mile, 
or about 2,100 kilometer, long pipeline that would connect the natural gas fields found in the Eastern 
Mediterranean to Greece, and then from Greece to Italy and on to Europe, at an estimated cost of €6 
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billion Euros, or about $6.7 billion dollars.45 The pipeline is being constructed by a group of energy 
companies from Greece, Italy, and Israel, and is working in conjunction with the Eastern Mediterranean 
Gas Forum.46 Even though the distance of EastMed is longer than Nord Stream and the cost is cheaper, 
it is projected that the EastMed will only be able to supply about 4 percent of the European Union’s 
annual natural gas imports.47 Although 4 percent of natural gas supply doesn’t seem like much when 
compared to the amount that Russia is able to supply Europe with, if the EastMed pipeline proves to be 
a viable alternative for Europe to procure natural gas instead of Russia, then that 4 percent is important 
in order to decrease dependence on Russia and decrease Russia’s economic power in Europe.  
The completion of Nord Stream 2 will effectively double the amount of natural gas Russia is able 
to supply to Germany through the same route as the Nord Stream pipeline.48 If you include the recently 
completed TukStream pipeline, and if they decide to extend its services farther into Europe, then Russia 
is doing an excellent job of cutting out Ukraine of the natural gas supply chain and increasing its ability 
to deliver natural gas at a cheap rate to Europe in order to incentivize Europe to not look for alternatives 
for natural gas needs.49 That is why a second pipeline is recommended to go along with the completion 
of the EastMed pipeline. Even if the second pipeline runs parallel to the EastMed pipeline and can only 
transport the same amount of natural gas as the EastMed, that is a move towards an alternative from 
Russian natural gas and decreases the reliance on Russian natural gas and the ability of Russia to benefit 
financially from their pipelines. If the Nord Stream pipeline was able to decrease revenues in Ukraine by 
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about $720 million dollars a year as mentioned earlier, then these pipelines have the ability to impact 
Russia financially in a substantial way. 
Impact: 
 The impact of this policy proposal would bring several benefits not only to U.S. interests and 
European energy security, but to the Eastern Mediterranean region as a whole. The first and main 
benefit of this policy proposal, which has been mentioned before, is that the Eastern Mediterranean Gas 
Forum and the EastMed pipeline offer a viable alternative for European countries to import natural gas 
and not be as reliant on Russia. As mentioned earlier, Russia already exports a large share of Europe’s 
total natural gas consumption and in the case of some countries it can supply up to one third of a 
countries gas imports.50 However, the EastMed pipeline, and subsequent pipelines that come from the 
Eastern Mediterranean area, have the protentional to offset some of those imports from Russia.51 This is 
important because even though the EastMed pipeline and any additional pipelines will not be able to 
replace Russia, it can reduce Russia’s market share. This would reduce not only Russia’s economic 
power, but also Russia’s ability to use their natural gas exports as a form of soft power to influence the 
actions of individual countries in Europe, the European Union as a whole, or NATO.52 The EastMed 
pipeline is useful since there are some countries in Europe, such as Germany, that do not have Liquified 
Natural Gas terminals in their country, so they rely on importing natural gas by pipeline, whether that is 
through a direct pipeline from Russia or through another system of pipelines that connect Europe.53 
 Another benefit that the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum and the EastMed pipeline have is 
that it can bring financial benefits for the countries involved in the gas forum and in the construction of 
the pipeline, in an area where some of the parties involved have historically not had the best of relations 
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and in an area of the world that is volatile. Membership of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum is 
comprised of Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Greece, Italy, and Jordan.54 Countries such as Egypt, Israel, and 
Jordan have not gotten along well historically, and the gas forum and EastMed pipeline offers an 
opportunity for them to work together in mutual cooperation in order for the region to benefit 
financially. Countries such as Greece and Italy were hit fairly hard during the 2008 financial crisis with 
Greece needing, and completing, a financial bailout from the European Union.55 Countries like Greece 
are still struggling with a high unemployment rate of 16.3 percent and a high youth unemployment of 
34.7 percent, the gas forum and any pipeline projects would have a significant economic impact on all of 
the countries involved.56 
 There are several risks associated with this policy proposal that may or may not occur depending 
on the situation in the region going forward, but that are important bring up for awareness. The first risk 
comes from the membership of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, or lack of membership, and lack 
of involvement in the EastMed Pipeline, Turkey. Turkey was not invited to be a part of the Eastern 
Mediterranean Gas Forum and has been against the EastMed pipeline. They have worked with Russia 
over the past several years to approve and construct the TurkStream pipeline that would send natural 
gas from Russia to Turkey, and then from Turkey to Eastern Europe and on to the rest of Europe.57 Soon 
after the announcement of the EastMed pipeline, Turkey announced a maritime boarder delineation  
deal with Libya, claiming the sea space that the East Med pipeline was going to be built in as a part of a 
Turkey-Libya maritime zone.58  
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 Another risk associated with the policy proposal is Russia’s reaction to any new pipelines that 
are not under their control. Research by Nathalie Hinchey found that when Russia is faced with natural 
gas competition, they lower their prices in order to compete and be the better choice. For example, 
when Lithuania build a liquified natural gas terminal to import LNG from other countries, they were able 
to get a 23% price decrease in natural gas from Russia since Russia did not want to lose out on exports 
to Lithuania.59 This means that once the EastMed pipeline is built and any subsequent pipelines are 
build, that Russia may just lower the cost of natural gas they export to European countries, such as 
Germany, that it makes the EastMed and other pipelines unaffordable and unable to compete with 
Russian prices.  
 A final risk that should be addressed that is associated with this policy proposal is the fact that 
European countries are going to pursue natural gas import policies that are in their own financial 
interest. Germany is a good example showing this point. Even though the U.S. and other countries had 
warned Germany and voiced their disapproval over the Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2 pipelines over 
security concerns, Germany still went ahead with both pipelines because it was more economically 
viable for them then constructing liquified natural gas terminals and was more reliable than getting it 
piped through Ukraine and the rest of Eastern Europe. Even though the EastMed pipeline is beneficial 
from a security standpoint, Germany and other countries may feel that they are better off obtaining 
their natural gas needs from Russia or other means. 
Effectiveness and Efficiency: 
 The effectiveness of this proposal can be determined by a decrease in the amount of natural gas 
that Europe imports from Russia. As mentioned earlier, if the EastMed pipeline can supply Europe with 4 
percent of their annual natural gas imports, and if that 4 percent is all decreased from Russian imports, 
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then the EastMed and any subsequent pipelines that also can transport another 4 percent supply to 
Europe are effective at decreasing Europe’s reliance on Russian natural gas.60 Table 2 below is a good 
illustration to show that by increasing the amount of natural gas that can be imported from the Eastern 
Mediterranean, Russian imports can decrease. As can be seen from the table, if a series of pipelines 
Table 2: Natural Gas Import Dependency Rates of Some EU Countries and Turkey- 201261 
 
from the Eastern Mediterranean to Europe can reduce Germany, Italy, and other European countries 
dependency on natural gas from Russia, then it could be considered an effective policy by strengthening 
the diversification of natural gas imports. The effectiveness of the policy is strengthened if countries in 
Europe, such as Germany and Italy, do not increase their overall consumption of natural gas, otherwise 
the policy may not be very effective. For example, if Germany decides to keep importing the same 
amount of natural gas from Russia and also decide to import natural gas from the Eastern 
Mediterranean, thus increasing their overall amount of natural gas that they import, then the 
effectiveness of this policy is diminished since the goal is to reduce the amount of Russian natural gas. 
For the policy to be effective and considered a success, Germany would have to increase the amount of 
natural gas it would import from the Eastern Mediterranean and decrease the amount they import from 
Russia, thus reducing their reliance on natural gas imports from Russia.  
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Turkey 98% Russia Iran Algeria Others 
58% 18% 9% 15% 
Spain 99% Algeria Nigeria Qatar Others 
42% 15% 12% 31% 
Italy 90% Algeria Russia Libya Others 
32% 28% 10% 30% 
Germany 86% Russia Holland Norway Others 
36% 26% 25% 13% 
  25 
 When looking at the efficiency of this proposal, it is important to look at what the potential 
costs are associated with building a pipeline through Greece, such as the EastMed pipeline, getting 
natural gas through an alternative route such as Turkey and the TurkStream pipeline, and building 
liquified natural gas terminals. The below table presents a good breakdown of the costs of building 
these different options. As can be seen, in terms of efficiency it would be best to build a pipeline from 
Table 3: Different Export Options Cost & Revenue Comparison62 
POSSIBLE EXPORT OPTIONS ESTIMATE COST $ millions 
ESTIMATED 
REVENUE $ millions 
Building an LNG Plant $12,600  $50,148  
Building a pipeline to Greece $19,510  $54,541  
Building pipeline to Turkey $4,780  $69,271  
DIFFERENCE TURKEY VS LNG $7,820  $19,122  
 
the Eastern Mediterranean through Turkey and on to Europe when looking to export natural gas from 
the region. However, Tukey is not a part of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum and the EastMed 
pipeline, and Turkey has decided to pursue the TurkeStream pipeline with Russia. Something to consider 
when looking at the efficiency of a pipeline through the Eastern Mediterranean is, as mentioned earlier, 
Turkey will most likely try to disrupt the construction and completion of the EastMed or any other 
pipeline as will be discussed in the political analysis below. While it may look that building LNG plants is 
more efficient based on the estimated cost, when comparing the cost to build and all of the security 
issues that come with shipping LNG from the Eastern Mediterranean to a port in Europe that can turn 
the LNG back into gas, it may actually not be more efficient. Although the building of LNG plants 
throughout Europe would be beneficial to the United States because the U.S. could then export more of 
its LNG that it has produced over the past several years, for the purpose of this policy proposal that 
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would not be efficient since it would not be shipping natural gas from the Eastern Mediterranean to 
Europe.63 In order to achieve the long term goal and success of this policy proposal to reduce the 
reliance of Russian natural gas, it would be more efficient to build a pipeline from the Eastern 
Mediterranean since the supply of natural gas would be more of a reliable supply. In the long run, it may 
be more efficient to build the pipelines to Greece since the estimated revenues are greater and once the 
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VI. Political Analysis 
This policy proposal is politically achievable due to several factors that will be discussed below, but it 
is also important to mention some political realities that may cause the policy to be delayed or 
ineffective. The main political barriers tend to be more geopolitical in nature since, for the most part, 
the United States domestic political atmosphere is one of wanting to pressure and hold Russia 
accountable for increased malign behavior and expanding influence.64 The histories of countries, 
geopolitical partnerships, and individual leaders of countries involved will all be factors to the success or 
disruption of this policy.  
Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum: 
As mentioned previously, the United States already holds observer status of the Eastern 
Mediterranean Gas Forum.65 If the United States decides to take a more active role in the Eastern 
Mediterranean Gas Forum by being a part of the energy summits and asking for full membership with a 
seat at the table, then it will be able to provide technical assistance, resources, and other expertise in 
order to ensure the successful construction of the EastMed Pipeline and any subsequent pipelines from 
the Eastern Mediterranean to Europe. Joining the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum does not require 
Congressional approval since it is not entering a treaty and is therefore not subject Senate ratification. 
The objective of joining the forum can easily be completed by the administration through a presidential 
proclamation or executive order once the parties of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum agree on 
allowing the United States to join.  
The political benefits of joining the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum is that the United States will 
be able to help strengthen the relationships of the other members, since many of the members in the 
                                                          
64 Alex Johnson. “Senate Joins House in Overwhelmingly Passing New Russia Sanctions”. NBC News. July 27, 2017. Available at: 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/senate-joins-house-overwhelmingly-passing-new-russian-sanctions-n787291. 
65 Ahmed Ismail. “France asks to join Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum”. Reuters.  January 16, 2020. Available at: 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-gas/france-asks-to-join-eastern-mediterranean-gas-forum-idUSKBN1ZF1V2. 
  28 
organization have a history of not cooperating politically and even engaging in active conflict against 
each other. Considering the member makeup of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, the United 
States has good relationships with just about every nation involved, with the majority of the cooperation 
being through security assistance to countries such as Israel and Egypt.66 Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and the 
Palestinian Authority, are all members of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum.67 This is a big 
geopolitical accomplishment for the region considering that these nations have historically and 
politically not gotten along with each other, and have had armed conflict and high tensions in an area of 
the world that is already fairly volatile. The United States should take this opportunity to encourage 
more cooperation and cohesion among the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum members to help 
increase political collaboration, economic development, and prosperity for the region. Through active 
participation in the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, the United States will be able to help bring 
together the participating countries to pursue their own financial interests while at the same time 
helping to facilitate a viable alternative to Europe for their natural gas imports. 
Europe: 
 One of the goals of the policy proposal is to have Europe become less reliant on Russian natural 
gas due to the potential for Russia to exploit its soft power in order to influence or coerce policy in 
Europe and NATO that may be detrimental to the international organizations or beneficial to Russia. 
Russia has a habit of interfering in the political affairs of countries in Europe and around the world.68 The 
United States and Europe share a close relationship with a history of helping each other out over the 
years. These relationships that have been built by average citizens and political leaders have led to, for 
the most part, the United States and Western Europe having a similar world view of which countries are 
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allies and which countries shouldn’t be trusted. The United States and Europe agree that Russia and its 
expanding influence pose a threat to political, military, and economic security of the United States and 
Europe. This is why countries wish to join NATO and the NATO relationship remains relatively strong 
even though the Cold War has ended.69 In fact, a recent study by Pew found that NATO is still viewed in 
a relatively favorable light by Europeans.70 This means that most European countries understand the 
issue of relying on Russian natural gas imports to fulfill their energy needs and would be welcome to 
diversifying their natural gas imports if a viable alternative existed such as the EastMed pipeline through 
the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum.71 This helps lead to a high possibility of this policy being 
politically successful with the backing of European allies and consumers as well. However, countries will 
pursue their own self-interests due to ease of access or budgetary constraints. Although Germany is 
wary of Russian aggression and influence in Europe, they still approved both the Nord Stream and Nord 
Stream 2 pipelines because they recognized the fact that they need to be able to import cheap natural 
gas and it was more cost effective to approve and build these pipelines rather than building LNG 
terminals. 
Another factor in the decision of whether or not to work with Russia comes from political 
relationships among country leadership. Using Germany as an example again, former German 
Chancellor Gerhard Schroder, who served as German Chancellor from 1998 to 2005, worked with Russia 
and other partners to lay the ground work and get approval for the first Nord Stream Pipeline.72 He now 
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serves as chairman of the shareholders committee for Nord Stream AG.73 Although Germany may have 
been warned at the time of the potential issues that could arise from being reliant on Russia for natural 
gas, the political reality ended up being that the project was approved for financial as well as political 
relationship reasons. This could cause a potential issue for the successful implementation of this policy 
due to the fact that there may be political pressure from former German leadership on current German 
leadership on finding alternative natural gas supplies. 
Another possible political issue that involves leadership personalities and relationships that 
could have a negative impact on this policy proposal comes from the relationships between the 
President of the United States and European leaders. President Trump has been quite vocal on his 
criticism of NATO allies and their commitment to paying the agreed upon 2 percent of GDP on 
defense.74 This, and other comments the President has made about the United States European allies 
have caused some European leaders to look at the current administration with skepticism about 
whether the United States will be the strong supporter of Europe that it has been in the past. The United 
States has had a strong, bipartisan, and public campaign against the completion of the Nord Stream 2 
pipeline from Russia to Germany.75 However, due to conflicts of personality at the leader level, Nord 
Stream 2 will proceed to completion after Denmark gave in and gave approval for the project after a 
public disagreement with the President of the United States.76 These examples show how there can be 
some political difficulties of getting European members to join and approve of this policy due to political 
disputes among leadership. However, in the end countries recognize that they need to diversify their 
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supply of natural gas and if the EastMed pipeline and the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum can provide 
that source of natural gas and if it is economically viable, then it should be able to overcome any 
political hiccups that conflicting leadership personalities might have. 
Russia: 
 One major factor to keep in mind when trying to determine the political success of this policy is 
the way that Russia will act and respond to the United States full support of the Eastern Mediterranean 
Gas Forum and the EastMed pipeline. Russia will essentially act how President Vladimir Putin wants 
since he has control over the country’s political institutions as well as the energy institutions since 
Gazprom and other energy companies act similar to stare run companies due to the close relationship 
between the political leaders and the leaders of the companies. One major factor that was mentioned 
before is that if Russia feels threatened by the EastMed pipeline and its supplies of natural gas to 
Europe, they will lower their gas prices significantly in order to ensure that they can still have their 
market access and drive out competition.77 Putin would be able to do this because he would be able to 
direct Gazprom to take a loss in the short term in order to drive out the natural gas being supplied by 
the EastMed pipeline.  
 Another response by Russia to the construction of the EastMed pipeline, and any other 
subsequent pipelines, would be for Russia to construct new pipelines as well to give itself greater reach 
throughout Europe. One other pipeline that has been mentioned previously in this proposal is the 
TurkStream pipeline that goes from Russia, through the Black Sea, to Turkey. From there, Russia could 
decide to expand it and have it go through eastern Europe and into Western Europe as another way for 
them to export their natural gas and in an attempt to drive out competition. Russia has shown that they 
have the capability and will to maintain their hold on natural gas exports to Europe, so it should be 
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expected that they will have some type of response to how the United States approaches and engages 
with the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum. It is politically easier for Putin to direct the resources of the 
Russian government and Russia’s natural gas industry to respond to U.S. movements than it is for the 
U.S. to act, so the policy has to be strategic and understanding of any potential actions taken by Russia 
to undermine the success and completion of this policy proposal. 
Turkey: 
 Another important actor to the political success of this policy proposal that needs to be 
discussed is the continued actions and reaction of Turkey to the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum and 
the EastMed pipeline. Turkey is a strong economic and political player in the Eastern Mediterranean 
region, however, it was not invited to join the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum.78 As mentioned earlier 
in the proposal, after the announcement of the EastMed pipeline, Turkey used its naval and political 
power to create a maritime agreement with Libya which would effectively try to cut off any pipeline 
construction from the Eastern Mediterranean gas fields to Greece.79 President Erdogan of Turkey is 
doing this because Turkey was left out of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum and because he wants 
to protect Turkey’s interests and economic stability by ensuring that the TurkStream pipeline that is 
backed by Russia is used to deliver natural gas to Europe and not the proposed EastMed pipeline. 
Turkey’s actions and responses as well as any joint actions and responses with Russia need to be 
carefully monitored and evaluated when determining the success or failures of this proposal. Even 
though Turkey is a NATO ally, in recent years they have not been acting in a way that a NATO ally should 
be and have increasingly shifted closer to Russia. Even though the United States and other NATO allies 
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voiced their concerns and objections to Turkey purchasing the S-400 missile system from Russia, Turkey 
went ahead with the deal.80 
United States Congress: 
 In the United States Congress there is bi-partisan support for strong action against Russian 
aggression and interference both in Europe and in the United States. Both Senate Majority Leader Mitch 
McConnell (R-KY) and Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi (D-CA-12) have called for the implementation 
and continuation of sanctions against Russia for its malign behavior.8182 Congress has passed bi-partisan 
sanction legislation against Russia such as the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act 
which included heavy sanctions on Russia for a variety of areas including cyber security, crude oil 
projects, and financial institutions.83 Any policy which takes a strong stance against Russia and attempts 
to restrict their influence around the world should be met with political approval from the majority of 
Congress. Even though this proposal does not require Congressional approval to be implemented, it is 
still beneficial to have political support from some Republicans and some Democrats in Congress when 
moving forward.  
 Another area of the proposal that Congress would be likely to support is the cooperation and 
growth of the Eastern Mediterranean region including Israel and Egypt. Congress has always been strong 
supporters and been generous with funding when it comes to security assistance to both Israel and 
Egypt. 84 The proposed policy proposal of joining the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum and helping 
with the development of the region and construction of the EastMed pipeline and any other subsequent 
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pipelines should be political positives with Congress. Congressional support will be needed during 
appropriations season for funding for entities such as the previously mentioned International 
Development Finance Corporation (IDFC), if that entity will be used to help facilitate the development of 
the EastMed pipeline. However, getting political support for the IDFC should not be politically difficult 
considering the BUILD Act of 2018 which created the IDFC had bi-partisan support of eight Democrat, 
eight Republican, and one independent co-sponsors.85 
U.S. Domestic Politics and the 2020 Election: 
 This policy proposal has several positives for the current administration and the 2020 election. 
The main area it would affect has to do with Russia and the current administration. During the 2016 
election and after, the President and his administration have been under fire for Russian interference in 
the 2016 presidential election and acquisitions of collusion.86 This culminated in the appointment of a 
special counsel to investigate these allegations and resulted in the Mueller Report, which was released 
back in April of 2019.87 Allegations of working with the Russian’s or being weak on Russia have 
continued to follow the administration throughout the President’s first term, so any action taken that is 
able to weaken Russia and attempt to stop them from being able to spread their influence would be a 
political positive and could be used as messaging during the upcoming 2020 presidential race. It could 
be politically beneficial to be able to point to concrete steps that are being taken to combat Russia’s 
growing influence in Europe and to support our European allies by making them less reliant on Russia for 
their energy needs. One political issues that could arise from this policy for the President during the 
2020 election with his base would be that people would want to know why the United States is spending 
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money to construct something in the Eastern Mediterranean for the benefit of Europe, and not 
spending the money domestically or selling our liquified natural gas to Europe. 
This policy of supporting the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum and pipeline projects such as the 
EastMed pipeline should also be supported by U.S. energy companies that can help lead to stronger 
domestic support. In 2019, ExxonMobil discovered a large natural gas deposit off the coast of Cyprus in 
the Eastern Mediterranean, and Steve Greenlee, a VP at ExxonMobil, stated that the discovery was 
“encouraging” and that “The potential for this newly discovered resource to serve as an energy source 
for regional and global markets will be evaluated further”.88 This can be seen as a good signal that U.S. 
energy companies such as ExxonMobil would be supportive of more U.S. engagement and action being 
taken in the Eastern Mediterranean, and that support may also translate into political support of any 
administrative action in the region or congressional action in the region that has to do with developing 
the natural gas exports. The President and this administration have been strong proponents of the 
domestic U.S. energy sector and ensuring that U.S. energy production increases so that it can export 
excess energy.89 However, this policy could be a political success with U.S. energy companies even if it is 
not related to domestic supplies and production due to the opportunity to be involved in the 
development of the Eastern Mediterranean region. 
Another area that this policy could help politically is that the majority of Americans still feel strongly 
about supporting Israel, with 59% of Americans supporting Israel and 76% of Republicans still supporting 
Israel.90 Policies that could be seen as benefiting Israel and the region of the Eastern Mediterranean as a 
whole could be helpful in maintaining continued support among certain voting demographics. Even 
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people who do not support Israel and support the Palestinian Authority instead may support this policy 
since the Palestinian Authority is a member of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, however they 
would still be unlikely to support the administration since the EastMed pipeline is primarily between 
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VII. Recommendation 
I recommend that you approve of this policy proposal because supporting the Eastern 
Mediterranean Gas Forum and pipeline projects from the Eastern Mediterranean to Europe are in the 
United States best interest when it comes to reducing Europe’s reliance on natural gas from Russia and 
helping to build common interests among the participating countries of the gas forum. This policy 
proposal is not without its risks and challenges; however, it is still a policy that the United States and 
Department of State should pursue. 
As mentioned previously in the proposal, there are some issues to be wary about when moving 
forward toward implementation this proposal. The biggest cause for concern when implementing this 
foreign policy proposal is the actions that will be taken by both Russia and Turkey to interfere and 
reduce the impact that a successful Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum and alternative source of natural 
gas for Europe would have on the existing status quo. Russia will want to ensure it keeps it market share 
and will probably reduce the price of their natural gas to entice countries to continue to use import from 
them, since they have a history of doing this in the past with other Eastern European and former Soviet 
countries. Even though Russia relies on these exports for their own economic stability, due to the nature 
of Russian leadership and Putin’s control over the government and energy industries, they can take 
short term loses by lowing the price of natural gas exports if they can ensure long term contracts with 
Western European countries and maintain their market share. Turkey, who views themselves as a 
regional power in the Eastern Mediterranean, will want to ensure that the EastMed pipeline does not 
get built so that they can build a continuation of the TurkStream pipeline on towards central and 
western Europe, and because they are not a part of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum. The 
TurkStream pipeline and any action taken by Turkey may also be backed by or have Russian support 
since the TurkStream pipeline is a joint venture between Turkey and Russia, and Turkey has been 
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moving towards a closer relationship with Russia as can be seen by their decision to purchase the S-400 
missile defense system from Russia. 
With that being said, I still think that this policy proposal is worth pursuing for the United States 
government and the Department of State because it can achieve several policy and security goals 
against Russia and in the region. By supporting and joining the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum and 
supporting the construction of natural gas pipelines such as the EastMed pipeline, the United States will 
be able to help offer an alternative source of natural gas for European countries and help diversify their 
supply. This can help them to be less dependent on Russian natural gas, and in turn minimizes the 
potential risk of Russia increasing its influence over the countries that it exports natural gas to. Although 
many European countries are developing sustainable energy technology, most European countries still 
need to import and use natural resources such as natural gas and oil in order to fulfil their energy 
consumption needs. This proposal provides a realistic option for an alternate source of natural gas for 
our European allies so that they do not feel the need to pursue projects like Nord Stream and Nord 
Stream 2 in the future. This can help to strengthen the NATO alliance and U.S. relationship with our 
European allies while also limiting Russian influence and expansion in Europe.  
Another positive outcome of this policy proposal that would help in United States foreign policy and 
security objectives is that it can use the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum to help build security and 
financial cooperation among its members in the Easter Mediterranean region. The members who make 
up the gas forum have not been close allies in the past and have struggled with conflict and instability in 
their region for decades. This gas forum and U.S. participation can be used to help close the gap and 
help build better relations between U.S. allies like Israel and Egypt. By getting buy in from all of the 
members and help show the economic benefits of cooperating with each other, all members should be 
able to benefit financially from exporting natural gas to Europe as well as to their own countries for their 
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own needs. This can help to reduce the risk of instability and a rise of conflict in a region that is known 
for its instability and conflict.  
A final reason why this policy proposal should be pursued comes from the domestic side. The 
American public and Congress want to see tough measures taken against Russia and have been 
supportive of sanctions that have been passed in recent years. There is congressional support for issues 
of energy and security as can be seen by the passing of the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy 
Partnership Act of 2019 at the end of the last fiscal year. Congress wants to support our allies abroad 
while holding disruptive actors such as Russia and Turkey accountable for their actions and limiting their 
ability to spread their influence. This policy allows another way to be tough on Russia and supports allies 
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